Immaterial rewards and sanctions in a voluntary contribution experiment

In this paper, we compare the cause and effect of immaterial rewards and sanctions oncooperation in a voluntary contributions experiment. We find that both rewards andsanctions increase contributions only when subjects interact repeatedly, though rewardsseem to be more effective than sanctions. Moreover, in contrast to sanctions, rewards dohave an impact on future contributions. Although the direct effect is negative, there is apositive indirect effect that applies to subjects who contribute above (below) the groupaverage in a partner (stranger) matching. From this we conclude that sanctions andrewards are mainly used as a communication channel to coordinate on a more efficientoutcome. Nevertheless, subjects also seem to experience additional utility from receivingapproval, whereas they are insensitive to disapprovals.public economics ;

Truth, trust, and sanctions: On institutional selection in sender-receiver games

We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the impact of institutions and institutional choice on truth-telling and trust in sender-receiver games. We find that in an institution with sanctioning opportunities, receivers sanction predominantly after having trusted lies. Individuals who sanction are responsible for truth-telling beyond standard equilibrium predictions and are more likely to choose the sanctioning institution. Sanctioning and non-sanctioning institutions coexist if their choice is endogenous and the former shows a higher level of truth-telling but lower material payoffs. It is shown that our experimental findings are consistent with the equilibrium analysis of a logit agent quantal response equilibrium with two distinct groups of individuals: one consisting of subjects who perceive non-monetary lying costs as senders and non-monetary costs when being lied to as receivers and one consisting of payoff maximizers.Experiment, Sender-receiver games, Strategic information transmission, Institutional selection

Rewards in an Experimental Sender-Receiver Game

We show in a sender-receiver game with strictly opposing interests that rewards enhance trust but do not influence truth-telling. Subjects who reward tend to tell the truth and trust more often in the presence and absence of reward opportunities. The amount of obtained rewards thereby enhances truth-telling.microeconomics ;

An experimental comparison of sequential first- and second-price auctions with synergies

The presence of synergies in recurrent procurement auctions leads to an exposure problem and asymmetries among bidders. We consider sequential first- and second-price auctions with synergies in a setting with four bidders. In a series of experiments we compare the performance of the two pricing formats for three different sizes of the synergy. We find that for small synergies, the first-price auction performs better in terms of efficiency, revenue, and the probability on losses. However, once the synergy factor becomes very large the performance of the two different pricing formats becomes more similar. We also find that even though the potential total surplus that can be divided between buyers and seller increases in the synergy factor, subjects’ earnings within a pricing rule do not significantly change in the synergy factor. Finally, we observe that the two pricing formats give rise to different price trends within the auction sequence. In general, our results provide support for the common use of first-price instead of second-price auctions for public procurement.industrial organization ;

NIMBY, taxe fonci ere et vote par les pieds

A community of individuals heterogeneous in terms of revenue occupies a territory subdivided into zones characterized by unequal levels of amenities. Starting from the concept of land rent a la Ricardo, we propose a model determining the bid rents in the diff erent zones as well as the distribution of the population among these. We then study the impact of a shock a ffecting negatively the amenities in one zone on the rents of the other zones via a process of "voting with the feet" a la Tiebout. Starting from this analysis, we propose a taxation of land rent that allows for a compensation of the residents whose neighborhood is directly a ffected by the amenity shock by the other members of the community. Such is system may prevent NIMBY attitudes. Moreover, as far as rent is observable, the mechanism has the advantage of having no preference revelation problem.Une communauté e d'individus h ét érog ene en terme de revenus occupe un territoire divis e en zones caract eris ées par des niveaux d'am enit es di fferents. Partant du concept de rente a la Ricardo, nous proposons un mod èle determinant les rentes o ffertes dans les diff erentes zones et la r épartition de la population entre celles-ci. On étudie ensuite l'impact d'un choc a ffectant n egativement les am enit es d'une zone sur les rentes des autres zone via un processus de "vote par les pieds" à la mani ère de Tiebout. Partant de cette analyse, nous proposons un syst eme de taxation de la rente qui permet une compensation fi nanci ere des r esidents directement aff ect es dans leur voisinage par les individus non touch es. Ce syst eme est susceptible d'att enuer les attitudes du type \NIMBY". De plus, dans la mesure o u la rente est observable, le m ecanisme pr esente l'avantage de ne poser aucun probl eme de r ev elation des pr ef erences

Machine justice:Governing security through the bureaucracy of algorithms

The use of algorithms to predict behaviour is becoming the gold standard in criminal justice in various countries. This article critically analyses the algorithm-driven risk assessment tools used in predictive policing and predictive justice. First, we propose to see algorithms as essentially bureaucratic instruments. They are the digital offspring of the classic bureaucratic procedure, creating classification through standardised and impersonal decision-making. Second, we argue that the application of algorithms in criminal justice expands the bureaucratic field to areas previously understood as bulwarks of professional judgement. Third, we analyse the shift in purpose of algorithmic decision-making: instead of determining a citizen's status of beneficiary or obligate, we now see algorithmic anticipation of behaviour. This shifts the logic of decision-making over investigations, probations, and sentencing from individual judgement to bureaucratic classification based on the algorithms that are designed into risk assessments tools. This article is both a bureaucratic critique of algorithm-driven risk assessment tools in criminal justice and a call to rethink bureaucracy and bureaucratisation beyond the boundaries of public administration

Circulation of Railway Rolling Stock: A Branch-and-Price Approach

We describe an algorithmic approach to determine an efficient railway rolling stock circulation on a single line or on a set of interacting lines. Given the timetable and the passengers? seat demand, we develop a branch-and-price algorithm that results in an allocation of rolling stock material to the daily trips. In order to efficiently utilize the train units, they can be added to or removed from the trains at some stations along the line. These changes in train composition are subject to several constraints, for example corresponding to the order of the train units within a train. A solution is evaluated based on three criteria, i.e. the service to passengers, the robustness, and the cost of the circulation. The branch-and-price algorithm that we developed is tested on real-life instances from NS Reizigers, the main Dutch operator of passenger trains